

ci obrađuju zemlju kao što se radilo u antičkoj Palestini. Struktura grada je dugo zadržala srednjevjekovni karakter, putevi nisu izgrađivani do iza 1851. U drugom tematskom dijelu (*»Preobražaj osmanskog feudalizma i nacionalni pokreti«*), opisuje se klasična socijalna struktura u islamskom društvu. Čitlučenjem se mijenja profil feudalne klase i država zakonima osigurava ovu transformaciju. Iza austrougarske okupacije 1878, ova je politika nastavljena. Agrarno pitanje se rješava tek iza 1910, po sistemu otкупа. Zaostalost društva i nastojanje okupacionih vlasti da je politički eksploatiše, imaju za posljedicu da ojačava tendencija da se nacionalni pokreti dijele po vjerskom okviru. U osnovi je takav proces ostao i nakon pokreta za vjersku i prosvjetnu autonomiju.

Serbian nationality, language and writing, and the Serbs the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Sultan's sovereignty on condition that the immigrant Catholics be expelled.⁴⁷⁾ There remained a lot of vague points in connection with these secret negotiations, but one thing was clear, namely, that it was an agreement of the insincere about the mutual recognition of their strategic aims: rejection of Austria–Hungary, the granting of the lasting ties with the Sultan, on condition of the acceptance of Serbian nationality. None of the above survived. Among the old Moslem leaders, there was not a single one who advocated the idea of the unification of Yugoslavia, while among the young, who were growing in numbers all the time, there were less and less of those who cared for Sultan and his political patronage. Naturally, the basic mass of believers remained true to their feelings of Islamic solidarity and the traditions of the Turkish state.

Among the Serbian peasant masses the idea of some state other than a purely Serbian one never existed at all.

In such conditions no political agreement was possible. By the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, Austro–Hungarian policy succeeded in permanently separating the religious movements, and in keeping them apart.

Thus the meaning of the national renaissance which had lasted in the province since the middle of the XIXth century, becomes clear. From the very beginning it was obvious that national identification never crossed the religious barriers. Only the new generation of the young people did not remain loyal to the religion–conditioned politics, with the result that the idea of the unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a larger Yugoslav community, obtained a real historical foundation. At the same time it became permanently present in the history of the world, although it had scarcely been heard of as late as 1851.

Milorad Ekmečić

NAPREDAK CIVILIZACIJE I NACIONALNA POLITIKA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI XIX VIJEKA (Rezime)

Članak je podijeljen na dva posebna dijela. U prvom (*»Napredak civilizacije i nastanak nove građanske klase«*), daje se osvrt na spori razvoj proizvodnih snaga i modernizaciju starog islamskog društva. Stranim putnicima je izgledalo da bosanski selja-

47) Dževad Juzbašić: *Pokušaji stvaranja političkog saveza između vodstva srpskog i muslimanskog autonomnog pokreta u BiH*, (The Attempts of a Political Alliance between Serbian and Moslem Autonomous Movements in B and H), »Prilozi Instituta za istoriju u Sarajevu«, XIV, 1978, pp. 141–145.

They were formed on the model of identical German societies after 1848.⁴⁴⁾ The first such society was formed by the Jews (»Benevolencia«) and the Serbs followed suite. The Moslems and Croats also had their societies.⁴⁵⁾ In spite of the fact that the societies were forbidden any kind of political activity, they were actually a kind of elementary school of the national movements till 1903. From 1905 on, legal political parties were beginning to emerge. The essential characteristic of the policy of making the masses conscious of their nationality was that it was a movement of the minority in towns, of those 8 per cent who could read and write. The mass of peasants with 92 per cent of them illiterate, was the passive object of that policy. The relationship between the elite and the mass of the population did not have the same political dynamic: the elite attempted inter-religious co-operation, on condition that the solution of the agrarian issue be renounced, while the peasants lost patience. The two were never to come together, and each Serbo-Moslem political agreement remained confined to the circle of the few who represented the town elite.

The most important of the institutions which were substitute for a political organisation in the conditions of a despotic regime, was the autonomy of church and school communities. These were created after 1856, and they flourished especially after 1878. The Serbian scholar Stojan Novaković explained that such autonomous community activities were in fact »a national state within the alien state«. They had the right to manage Church business, to organize private schools, choose their teachers and priests and to organize public life within a limited scope, by organizing certain festivals and gatherings. The Austro-Hungarian authorities made an attempt to keep them strictly within a religious framework, but they tried in a hundred ways, and succeeded, to overstep these obstacles. It became more and more evident that Kallay's formula of modernization, conditioned by the creating the spirit of an artificial Bosnian nation could not succeed. The best description of this was given by a French diplomat: »Refinement of the means of suppression is not civilization«. The Serbian »autonomy movement« for the protection of the autonomous church and school began in 1896 and lasted till 1905, while the Moslem movement lasted from 1899 to 1909.⁴⁶⁾ Although they had some common points and complemented each other, in their final aims they held opposite positions: the Serbian aspired towards unification of all Serbs in a national state, the Moslem endeavoured to preserve the spirit of the Turkish political heritage and lasting ties with the religious mainstream in Turkey. Nevertheless, they tried to come to terms in 1901 and 1902 on condition that the Moslems accept

44) George L. Mosse: *The Nationalisation of the Masses. Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*, New York, 1975.

45) Đorđe Pejanović: *Kulturno-prosvetna, humana i socijalna društva u Bosni i Hercegovini za vreme austro-ugarske vladavine*, (The Educational, Humanistic and Social Associations in B and H during the Austro-Hungarian Rule), Sarajevo, 1930.

46) Nusret Šehić: *Autonomni pokret Muslimana za vrijeme austro-ugarske uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini*, (The Moslem Autonomous Movement under the Austro-Hungarian Administration in B and H), Sarajevo, 1980.

inst the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a model of pan-Islamic resistance against the European powers.⁴²⁾

The pan-Islamic movement supported by the Turkish Sultan was created in the belief that the reform policy with the support of the western-European states had cut the roots of the Ottoman state, so that a slow turn towards introduction of Islamic fundamentalist ideas was being made. By 1880 a committee was formed in Mecca for rallying all pan-Islamic movements from India to Bosnia, and it had its representatives in the numerous Bosnian and Albanian emigration groups in Turkey. Simultaneously, the old pan-Slavic movement was defeated by 1878, and was undergoing transformation.⁴³⁾ The new pan-Slavism after 1878 had a large number of Serbian representatives who formed a Committee for the Liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their objective was to make the pan-Slavic movement more democratic and to tie it to European liberation movements. At the same time, it was planned that all political disputes between the Slavonic peoples should be solved by plebiscite and democratic measures. This new form of pan-Slavism emphasized its alliance with the Moslem aristocracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and by promising that the Serbian movement would withdraw its demand for a solution of the agrarian issue, they tried to create an alliance with the pan-Islamic leadership. The result of this attempt was co-operation of the Serbian-Orthodox with the Moslems in a joint uprising against Austria-Hungary in Herzegovina in 1882.

Just as he had not supported the idea of the nationalizing process of the Albanians, the Turkish Sultan feared the Serbianising of the Moslems in the Balkans. Thus from March 1882 he preferred to communicate with the Vienna government about the maintenance of the occupational status of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of the Habsburg state. Thus because of these mutual pan-Islamic and pan-Slavonic illusions Serbo-Moslem co-operation in 1882 proved to be a failure and could never be renewed to the same extent, but it had one lasting result: the permanent political strategy of the Serbian national movement became national unity with the Moslems and the creation of a common national movement of unity in case of a plebiscite against Austria-Hungary. It was believed that the occupational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to go through an internal crisis and that the European powers would demand at a new diplomatic congress, that the people themselves had their say as to the form of their state.

In the conditions of the despotism of the Kallay regime after 1882, the previously open national policy became secretive and found substitute for its political activity in activating various cultural, musical and sports societies.

42) Milorad Ekmečić: *Ustanak u Hercegovini 1882. i istorijske pouke*, (The Uprising in Herzegovina 1882 and Historical Consequences), »Prilozi Instituta za istoriju u Sarajevu«, 19, 1982, p. 28.

43) S. D. Skazkin: *Konec Avstro-Rusko-Germanskogo sojuza*, Moskva, 1928 (second edition 1974), p. 108.

all citizens belonged. From the beginning of 1870-ies official papers in Sarajevo advised »Christian and Jewish children« to call themselves Ottomans and to retain that name as their national name.³⁷⁾

Austria-Hungary would continue in the same vein after 1878. Especially at the time of the »Kallay regime«, 1882 – 1903, the authorities did all they could to modernize the society, on condition that the people be re-educated as national consciousness was concerned. National names were forbidden, and the idea of a Bosnian nation and a Bosnian literary language, which differed from both Serbian and Croatian, was systematically encouraged.

Until recently, historians used up a lot of paper explaining Kallay's politics, without finding the correct answers to numerous unclear questions. Kallay developed the theory that in these regions the national movement was not yet developed, so his main objective was not to allow Moslem population to gain national consciousness in the Serbian manner.³⁸⁾ At the news that in 1893, some prominent Moslems in Herzegovina had chosen to declare themselves Serbs, he ordered that »that malediction be nipped in the bud.« He believed that by transplanting the Hungarian idea of »political people« as sovereign in an ethnically mixed land, the consciousness of a new »Bosnian nation« could be developed. Because of this he supported Moslem separatism and the ideas of the Moslem ethnic particularity both publicly and secretly.

The policy of encouraging national and religious friction in Bosnia and Herzegovina was quite successful and except in the case of the young after 1903, the political movements of the Serbs, Croats and Moslems never united with each other.

It was only in 1844 that most of the Catholic friars had been included to co-operate with Serbia, and 39 friars »meaning well for the good of the people« collaborated actively.³⁹⁾ The co-operation was never renewed, and from the 1860-ies Catholic clergy in the provinces worked openly in support of Austro-Hungarian occupation. The error of 1878 determined the pattern of behaviour of the Serbian national movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conviction of some Yugoslav historians that the resistance of the Moslem and Serbian-Orthodox against Austro-Hungarian occupation of 1878 had autochthonous roots,⁴⁰⁾ is not tenable. Recent research showed that the idea of resistance had come from the Turkish Sultan⁴¹⁾ and that the armed resistance aga-

37) »Bosna«, 183, 6, 18, January 18, 1870; J. A. Petrosjan: *Iz istoriji propagandi doktrini osmanizma na Balkanah*, »Tjurkologičeskij sbornik«, Moskva, 1973, p. 143.

38) Tomislav Kraljačić: *Režim Benjamina Kalaja, 1882-1903*, (The Manuscript of Ph. D., Sarajevo, 1982)

39) Vladimir Stojančević: *Južnoslovenski narodi u Osmanskom carstvu od Jedrenskog mira 1829. do Pariskog kongresa 1856*, (The South Slavic Peoples in the Ottoman Empire from Adrianople Peace Settlement 1829 till Paris Peace Settlement 1856), Belgrade, 1971, p. 197.

40) *Naučni skup »Otpor Austro-ugarskoj okupaciji 1878. godine«*, (The Essays presented at the Conference »Resistance to the Occupation of B and H 1878«), Sarajevo, 1979.

41) Roderic H. Davison: *The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin*, »Der Berliner Kongress von 1878«, Wiesbaden, 1982, pp. 217, 218.

Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought a new quality into the political history of the province. Its basic objective was to make impossible the unification of Serbs and Croats within a single Yugoslav state. The historical meaning of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina was formulated by general Sarkotić, the governor of the province in 1917: Bosnia was to be »a breach between Serbia and Croatia which would prevent any form of Yugoslav unity«, but with time it betrayed that role and became »less and less the breach that separates, and more and more the fire which connects the explosives on the left and right banks of a river.«³⁴⁾

The difference between national movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Turkish and Austro-Hungarian time lay in the fact that up to 1878 they were supported by the peasant class, while from 1878 onwards the middle-class from towns was taking over. The »National renaissance« in Bosnia and Herzegovina was considerably late in comparison with that in the rest of the Habsburg Empire. Nevertheless, they had the same dynamics: the middle-class, small in numbers, tried to act as political leader of the peasant majority, through a system of institutions, which instilled in the consciousness of the people the legal objective for which they strove. Those institutions were schools, newspapers, literature, church and choral activities, and sports and cultural societies. In 1910 a majority, 920 of the people were still illiterate, and that showed the greatness and the tragedy of the attempt of the urban minority to lead society by legal means. The first such attempt at »national renaissance« was initiated by the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1851. At that time there existed a network of secret organizations in the area, which worked under the control of the Serbian government. They were founded in Belgrade in 1849, and were to last with some breaks till 1874. The Turkish authorities from the very beginning fought against this movement, and tried to nip it in the bud. By the order of the Government Commissar, Kyuamil-Pasha, of 1853, the names »Serb« and »Latin«, for the Orthodox and Catholic population respectively, were banned as a novelty, and it was ordered that the former official names of »Urum« and »Catholic« be used.³⁵⁾ During the reforms of 1865 Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained administrative autonomy and the Turkish Government interpreted this as follows: »Bosnia has preserved its historical individuality in spite of all the changes that time has brought, and its ancient nationality has survived here all turmoils of the past. The Bosnian people fully manifest their nationality, which is not only genetic, but historically connected with this land.«³⁶⁾ This attempt at the creation of an artificial Bosnian nation proved unworkable, and the authorities had given it up already in 1868, after creation of the theory of the unitarian »Ottoman nation«, to which

34) Milorad Ekmečić: *Društvo, privreda i socijalni nemiri u Bosni i Hercegovini*, (The Society, Economy and the Social Disturbances in B and H), »Istorija srpskog naroda«, VI-1, Belgrade, 1983, p. 560.

35) Ibid, p. 485; Berislav Gavranović: *Bosna i Hercegovina od 1853. do 1870*, Sarajevo, 1956, p. 44.

36) The Leading article in »Bosanski vjestnik«, I, Sarajevo, 1866.

with Moslems. A new police force, army and administration were created. From the *Vilayet* Law of 1865, Bosnia and Herzegovina got some kind of administrative autonomy like other historical provinces of the Empire. Besides a governor, there was a Provincial Council in which the representatives of Christians and Jews were seated. Turkish was not the only language of administration and public life, but Serbian in the reformed Serbian Cyrillic, which was used by other Serbs outside the Turkish Empire, was introduced. The only difference was that the Turkish administration stubbornly rejected the national name of the people and the language, and kept calling it »Bosnian« or »local«. Moreover, a large number of school textbooks which were printed by the state, were translations of textbooks from Serbia, in which Serbian names were merely deleted.³¹⁾

The effecting of the new reforms, and especially the organizing of the new army after a European model, and with European arms, required a lot of money. A way out was found in increased loans from European banks, mostly British and French. The previous habit of paying for the import of goods with export of gold³²⁾ had caused a general outflow of gold from the Turkish lands. By 1876, when it went bankrupt, Turkey was already so deep in debt, that in order to repay its foreign obligations it had to pay 300 million francs out of the 380 million which was the total annual revenue.³³⁾ Such enormous demands of foreign banks influenced the rapid increase of taxes. Tithe was the main tax, so that it had been several times above its nominal value by 1875.

The impossibility of paying such high taxes caused rebellions in Herzegovina, Bosnia and other parts from the middle of 1875. The rebellion lasted till the middle of 1878 and was the reason for the opening of the »Great Eastern Crisis« of that time. Serbia and Montenegro started war against Turkey with the design of creating a common Serbian state from Vidin in Bulgaria to the western frontiers of Bosnia and Skadar in Northern Albania.

In the course of 1876 the rebels in Bosnia proclaimed unification with Serbia, and in Herzegovina unification with Montenegro. This immediately caused an international crisis and Austro-Hungarian political intervention. Ever since the defeat of the 1848 revolution the Austrian government had feared that by unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, a strong Serbian state, attractive for the Croats, would be formed.

Finally, by the international mandate granted at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Austria gained the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and establish order there.

31) Vojislav Bogićević: *Istorija razvitka osnovnih škola u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1463 do 1918*, (The Historical Development of Primary Schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, 1965, pp. 57-58.

32) F. E. Bailey: *British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement. A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations 1826-1853*, Cambridge, 1942, p. 77.

33) A. Du Velay: *Essai sur l'histoire financière de la Turquie depuis le regne du Sultan Mahmoud II jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris, 1903, p. 183.

who was the owner of the land; the peasant who tilled it, or the feudal lord who had leased it from the Sultan. The argument of the peasants had always been that their memory was quite fresh, and that they knew that the aristocracy seized it only recently. They sent a complaint to the Sultan in Istanbul in 1859 in which they said that »there are people in Bosnia who remember very well that certain *ciftiks* appeared only recently. Some mighty bey would appear with his armed retinue in a village and forced the *raya* to cede their land and to pay him dues.«²⁸⁾ The same tune could also be heard at the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation. It was well-known that the basic tax that a peasant paid to his feudal lord – the »third«, was introduced only after the agrarian reforms of 1848, and introduced to Northern Bosnia along the lines of similar institutions in Croatia and Hungary. Thus, undergoing reforms, Turkish feudalism assumed west-European forms, just at the time when such feudalism was being toppled and had begun to disappear from the historical scene in Central Europe.

This controversy about the matter of land ownership peasants solved by a series of bloody rebellions. From 1848 to 1875, the reason for all of them had been the attempts at agrarian reform in which legal right to own the land was given to nobility and not to the peasants. The biggest of those rebellions, called »Luka Vukalović's Rebellion« after one of its leaders, took place between 1852 and 1862. The French diplomacy was to blame for the rebellion. As early as 1948 France demanded from the Turkish Sultan the introduction of social reform for the peasants, and that Serbian vice-governors from the Principality of Serbia be brought into the Turkish administration.²⁹⁾ The Turkish government refused to carry out these measures, but it admitted that the position of Christian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the rule of the Moslem aristocracy was unbearable. Proclamation of reforms in 1851 caused the rebellion of the conservative Moslem population, and it was crushed in blood in a few months.³⁰⁾ There were such rebellions for preservation of the old Moslem order later as well. This one was the greatest and most important from the historical point of view. After the Constitution of 1876 was passed the rebellion was repeated, accompanied by the carrying of the shroud of the Prophet Muhammed through the Bosnian towns. These were the distant omens of later Moslem fundamentalism. After the proclamation of the new reform law for the entire Empire (*Hatti Humayun*) in 1856, the reforms got an overall framework and brought about a thorough change in the Turkish Empire. New courts were formed before which Christians were equal

27) »Sammlung der für Bosnien und die Herzegovina erlassenen Gesetze, Verordnungen und Normalweisungen« 1878-1880, Sarajevo, 1880 (second edition 1906).

28) Nil Popov: *Položenije raji v sovremenoj Bosnii*, »Slavjanskij sbornik«, Sanktpetersburg, 1875, p. 333.

29) Pančo Darev: *Dokumenti za blgarskata istorija*, (The Sources for the Bulgarian History), III, Sofia, 1940, p. 305.

30) Galib Šljivo: *Omer-paša Latas u Bosni i Hercegovini 1850 - 1852*, (Omer-paša Latas in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Sarajevo, 1977.

The Sultan discontinued the old feudal system in 1833, when in the general spirit of reform it became obvious that also the obsolete social system of state ownership of the land should be reformed. Because of the resistance to reforms, in Bosnia and Herzegovina that decision was put into effect as late as 1851, when by means of a bloody pacification of a great Moslem rebellion, the old feudal lords (*spahi*) definitely disappeared, and a new nobility in which the old *spahi* constituted less than one third, was created.²⁴⁾ Although the intention of the Turkish government was the abolition of feudalism, the attempt failed and new relations were created on feudal foundations, since the new landowners also held their estates on the copy-hold basis, and not on the basis of paid manpower.²⁵⁾ Thus the attempt at reform failed and ended in a new revitalisation of feudalism, which was now much closer to classical European feudalism, than the previous Ottoman one. Upon the abolition of the system of Sultan ownership of land, the income of the former feudal lords was taken over by state officials.²⁶⁾ Legally, the process ended when a new »Agrarian Law« was passed in 1858, the same year it was done in Egypt, whose agrarian reform was considered a model to be followed in the Turkish Empire. There existed a free peasant, but he was always of the Moslem faith, and of 77.000 free peasant families in Bosnia and Herzegovina only 5% were Christian. In a dilemma whether to give the land in private ownership to its Christian tillers, or to the Moslem feudal lords, the Sultan preferred the latter, so as a consequence, feudalism was not abolished in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 1918. The transformation of the old into new feudalism lasted long after 1878, and the Austro-Hungarian administration completed it with a series of laws enacted until 1880.²⁷⁾ All Turkish land-reform laws were translated into German and became a part of legal practice.

The reason for this was the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the Moslem aristocracy was the main social pillar which would guarantee the continuity of Habsburg rule. They believed that the Moslem aristocracy constituted a viable establishment-elite, so the attempt was made to create a social system which would, in time, become a replica of the Hungarian system in which the reformed aristocracy stood at the head of the society. This was contradictory to the basic motif of social progress in the Balkans. The peasants aspired to create a community of free peasants after the example of independent Serbia after 1815.

The reform of the feudal social order was not accomplished without great peasant revolutions. Any reform in land-ownership began with the question

24) A. S. Aličić: *Uredjenje bosanskog ejaleta od 1789. do 1878. godine*, (The Organisation of the Administration in Bosnian Eyalet), Sarajevo, 1983; Isti: *Odnosi sela i grada u Bosni i Hercegovini u XIX vijeku*, (The Village and Town in B and H during the XIX Century), »Jugoslavenski istorijski časopis«, 1-2, 1974.

25) The conclusion made by the Turkish modern historian H. Inalcik. See A. D. Novičev: o.c, p. 104.

26) Gabriel Baer: *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, Chicago, London, 1969, p. 64; The same author: *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950*, London, 1962, pp. 6,13.

total amount of land was *wakf* land, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878)²² the figure was one third. The difference is a result of the difference in the density of the Moslem population.

In any case, this did not mean social progress but social degeneration. That process could not be stopped even by Austro-Hungarian occupation, when there was an attempt to strengthen the system and make it live. When in 1910 an attempt was made to solve the agrarian problem by purchasing the land from the nobility, the official conclusion was that the Moslem landowners could not change, and should their estates or parts of them be taken from them, and money given in return, 9 out of 10 of them would squander it. The Islamic feudal system did not recognize the institution of hereditary nobility. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina that fact is questioned even nowadays. The struggle for political sovereignty was based on historical right, which, in the common consciousness is far more powerful than the right of an individual to gain civil rights. So the myth was created that the Bosnian and Herzegovinian nobility was a unique exception in the Islamic world, and that it was hereditary, since the nobility of the mediaeval Christian kingdom, as a sign of gratitude for the preservation of their estates, converted to Islam. It is difficult to establish when this theory was put forward.

The theory was questioned most at an official «Agrarian Conference» in Vienna in 1879 at which the state dignitary Dr. M. Kukuljević explained that the nobility in Bosnia and Herzegovina took its origin from the pre-Turkish period, so that therefore it had all legal rights to the estates it held.²³) Soon after this some serious scholars set out to prove this theory and it has remained popular to this day. However, some doubts in connection with it have always been very convincing. Even a part of the great Moslem noblemen asked the Austro-Hungarian Emperor in 1894 to institute a scholarly investigation of the real histories of the noble families, so that the real nobility could be protected by law and their titles of European nobility be recognized; for just before 1914, nearly 33,000 men and women believed that they had a right to the Moslem noble titles (the lower that of *agha*, and the higher that of *bey*).

According to the Ottoman feudal system the land was considered the property of the Sultan, and he gave it to his feudal lords to be enjoyed temporarily, as a reward for their military service. Among the first landowners (*timarlar*) in the XVth and XVIth centuries, there were also some former noblemen from Christian states, but the new Turkish feudal lords and the old Christian ones were by no means the same persons. That system began to deteriorate from the XVIth century onward by the creation of a new type of land ownership-*ciftlik* and *ocaklik timarlari*.

22) M. A. Ubicini: *Lettres sur la Turquie*, II, Paris, 1854, p. 175; A. D. Novičev: *Borba između reformatorami i konservatorami v period Tanzimata* (1839-1853), »Tjurkologičeskij sbornik«, Moskva, 1975, pp. 104-105.

23) Hamdija Kapidžić: *Agrarni odnosi u Bosni i Hercegovini*, (The Agrarian Relations in B and H), Sarajevo, 1969, p. 94.

blame for this state of affairs, where the turcification of schools was systematically pursued. According to Turkish official data, in 1870 there were 934 Moslem, 68 Serbian, 28 Croatian and 11 Jewish schools.²⁰⁾ Of lower secondary schools (*Rushdiye*) were 30 in 1878, and in them, besides the »local language«, Turkish and Arabic, Turkish history, and the reading of the Koran were taught. Besides these, there was also a Teacher Training College, and a Military School, as well as a school for the training of officials of the Turkish administration. The result of all this had been that up to 1878 the Moslems of Bosnia and Herzegovina had an educated class which was more Turkish in character than European or Yugoslav. Since 1866 there was one state printing press in which books in Turkish and Serbo-Croatian were printed, and since that time, two official papers were printed. Besides another printing press at a Franciscan monastery near Mostar, there were no others.

The emergence of an intelligentsia depended on the competition of two ideas of modernization in society: one, that of the Turks and the Austro-Hungarian state, and the other, the formula of modernization put forth by the national movements. The Serbian national movement was well to the fore. Up to 1914 a total of 16 printing presses were built,²¹⁾ and on the intensity with which they worked depended the dissemination of the written word from the main towns to the smaller places and villages. Besides state schools, the opening of private schools was also permitted; the largest number of them sprang up among the Serbs. These schools were supported by annual donations by the citizens (up to 50 »Napoleon« golden pieces). The schools were first opened at the beginning of the 1850-ies, and there were 64 of them by 1878, and 126 all together, by 1916. The reason for the increase in numbers was partly the fear of the Serbian national leadership that the whole of life would be controlled by the officials brought from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were mostly of Catholic faith. As early as 1913 there were 319 (47%) secondary school graduates of Catholic faith, 265 (38%) Serbian-Orthodox, and 100 (14%) Moslems. The first group of 8 graduates in Sarajevo in 1898, represented the beginning of an autonomous Serbian intelligentsia from the ranks of which the main opposition in the country would arise.

The Transformation of Ottoman Feudalism and National Movements

There has been a widespread mistaken notion that the Ottoman feudal system was undergoing transformation in the direction of a free-market and capitalist social order. Statistics would easily prove that the reverse was true, so that it is calculated that in the first part of the XIXth century the state land (*erazi miri*) which was the main land fund in the Empire became mainly the property of Moslem religious institutions (*wakf*). In Anatolia two thirds of the

20) Hajrudin Ćurić: *Muslimansko školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini do 1918*, (The Rise of the Moslem Schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 1918), Sarajevo, 1983, p. 187.

21) Kemal Hrelja: *Industrija Bosne i Hercegovine do kraja prvog svjetskog rata*, (The Development of Industry in B and H till the End of the First World War), Belgrade, 1961, p. 80.

te emergence of the middle class, came also a late political movement, and first of all the late maturing of an awareness of nationality.

The local middle class was compradorial in character. Nothing like an industrial middle class existed. When at the beginning of the XXth century the Serbian national leadership considered what was to be done to diminish the importance of the Austro-Hungarian administration and increase the role of the people, it recommended the opening of schools, the printing of books, and the starting of new craftsmen's workshops in order to prevent migration across the Atlantic. Industry was not mentioned, because the society was nowhere near being able to cope with it. In 1907 out of 6.833 enterprises in the provinces, there were 4.969 (72,7%) small firms with 2 workers at the most. In 1911 general mentality was fettered by exaggerated respect for tradition, so much so that the Sarajevo craftsmen demanded the restoration of the guilds which had been banned in 1851.

Financial institutions in general appeared rather late. Some attempts during Turkish rule in the 1870-ies at the creation of village savings-institutions (*menafi sanduklari*) did not survive the termination of the Turkish period. The first bank was a Catholic pawn-shop, opened on the initiative of the Mostar Bishop in 1872 by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Monte di pieta*) on the premises of its Consulate in Mostar. From 1895 existed an official Privileged Regional Bank for Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which Serbian politicians complained that it was the financial branch of the occupation administration, for »not a single banking institution, not a single private bank in Europe is so much dependent on the political authorities, and so liable to political instructions« as this one.¹⁷⁾ For a long time international capital evaded Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the feudal economic structure was unsuitable.¹⁸⁾ From the beginning of the XXth century political movements tried hard to make up for the long-neglect of this activity, and they sped up their efforts towards the creation of national banking. By 1914 a network of local banks had been created, almost each of which had a religious or national name: 26 Serbian, 10 Croatian, and 8 Moslem. But their existence was more important for national politics, than for the economy. Their role in the economy was minimal, for in all economic investments of the time the ratio of foreign to local capital was 10:1, in favour of foreigners.¹⁹⁾ German capital was dominant, and just before 1914, out of 100 millions of capital invested in the Bosnian economy, 88 came from Germany.

A modern intelligentsia came into being as a result of the fear that the educated part of society would be comprised only of immigrant Catholics and Austro-Hungarian officials. The Turkish policy of reforms after 1856 was to

17) Nikašinić: *Die Privilegierte Landesbank für Bosnien und Herzegovina*, Prague, 1902, p. 67.

18) Bernard Michel: *Banques et banquiers au debut du 20e siecle*, Paris, 1967, p. 233.

19) Tomislav Kraljačić: *Uloha cizlho kapitálu ve vývoji kapitalismu v Bosne a Hercegovine*, (The Role of the foreign Capital Investments in B and H), »Economic History«, VII, Prague, 1981, p. 378.

against Serbia. However, one thing is definitely true: in that endemically closed community, foreign influence was crucial for its progress.

The social history of Bosnia and Herzegovina became ambiguous, when it becomes clear that understanding of it depends on one's patience in reading tiresome statistical data about the relationships of various religions. In that feudal society the nobility and free peasants were Moslems, dependent peasants and merchants in towns were the Serbian-Orthodox, and peasants and occasionally craftsmen were Catholics. In time middle class will become the driving force of each group. Around 1910 the percentage of the population living in towns was only about 5%. There were 85.000 serffamilies to 6 or 7 thousand families of nobility.¹²⁾ The word »nobility« should not in this case evoke the usual European idea of nobility, since a part of the Bosnian nobility was impoverished (in 1910 there were as many as 10.463 members of noble families with landed property and serfs, and 4.281 without serfs). It often happened that one noble family lived from the exploitation of just one peasant family. That was the highest degree of exploitation – one man lived on the toil of another. In 1911 the writer Petar Kočić calculated that a peasant had to give two-thirds of his annual product in taxes to the state, the municipality, the church and his feudal lord.¹³⁾ That percentage remained permanently fixed, and at one time it was the same in all areas. Christians could become nobles by purchasing land, and this was especially true after 1878, when it was recorded that more than 600 people decided to take that risk.

It does not seem too bold to conclude that here too, religious teaching as to the loaning of money and Christian sin, played a certain role in the class distribution of the population. In the vicinity of Kakanj a place is mentioned, where passing Catholic peasants threw stones believing that the first man in Bosnia who granted loans to people was buried there.¹⁴⁾ And in a »paper war« between the Serbian-Orthodox and Catholic monks on sin and money-lending in (1851–1853), the Catholic side persistently stuck to the theological dogma that giving or taking money on loan was sinful. The idea of righteous deeds, about which a Catholic priest preached to his peasants (»The best dinner is the one earned righteously«) explicitly did not include trade.¹⁵⁾ A Frenchman joked about that: »God has given rule on Earth to the Serbian-Orthodox, while rule in Heaven he has left to the poor Catholics.«¹⁶⁾ With the la-

12) Dr A. Feifalik: *Ein neuer aktueller Weg zur Lösung der bosnischen Agrarfrage*, Wien, Leipzig, 1916, p. 2.

13) Petar Kočić: *Agrarna politika bosanske vlade*, (The Agrarian Policy of the Bosnian Government), in »*Sabrana Djela*«, III, Sarajevo, 1967, p. 111.

14) Toma Kovačević: *Opis Bosne i Hercegovine*, (The Description of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Belgrade, 1865, p. 51.

15) (Rafo Barišić): *Obrana pravovjernog i pravoslavnog iliti rimo-katoličnog sveštenstva i naroda u Hercegovini* (In Defense of the Rightfull and Wellbelieving Catholic Clergy and Population of Herzegovina), Dubrovnik, 1853, p. 174.

16) E. De Saint-Marie: *L'Herzegovine. Etude géographique, historique et statistique*, Paris, 1875, p. 72.

liable to infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis.⁷⁾ Great epidemics, »plague, cholera, and other severe diseases« happened at these intervals: 1813-16, 1832, 1834, 1836-7, 1843, 1849, 1865-75.⁸⁾ The border with Dalmatia was closed because of these epidemics for several decades after the beginning of the last century.

The only reliable data on demographic development are the official Austro-Hungarian censuses after 1879. At that time 1,158.000 inhabitants lived on 51,1 thousand square kilometers. About 3 decades later the number had increased to 1,898.000. In the first census 42,88% Serbian-Orthodox were registered, 18,08% Catholics, and 38,73% Moslems. From that time on the number of Catholics began to increase rapidly, the number of Moslems declined, and the number of Serbian-Orthodox increased slightly.⁹⁾ The sad man of the Bosnian XIX century, as if separated by walls into religious groups, never provided ready for use statistics. The ratio of these religions was 4, 3, 2. Whichever way one looked, none of them had a clear-cut majority and from these unsurmountable additions and dividings, a modern political tragedy grew.

Migrations changed the demographic picture of the province and the relations among the religious groups. It is believed that 150.000 people lost their lives in the uprising of 1875-1878, and another 260.000 in the period from 1878 to 1910. After the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian army 140.000 Moslems emigrated for political reasons, and 40.000 Serbian-Orthodox for both political and economic reasons.¹⁰⁾ It seems paradoxical that the more the peasants' right to land-ownership increased, the more readily they chose to emigrate. Financial fringe-benefits did not accompany agrarian liberation, so the Anatolian fields seemed more alluring to the Moslems, and the American mines to the Serbian-Orthodox. The fatal expression »emigrant fever« came into use after 1902, when all the male population wanted to go somewhere. Only the Catholic population increased in number because of immigration. Modernization could not be imagined without foreign experts of all professions - from maid-servants and farmers, to factory-engineers and police experts. By 1911 a network of 20 German farmers' colonies had been created.¹¹⁾ Judging by the frequent locating of these colonies along the Drina, it seemed that the Austro-Hungarian authorities intended to put up an ethnically safe barrier

7) »O degeneraciji bosanskog stanovništva« (On Degeneration of the Bosnian Population), »Pregled«, I, Sarajevo, 1910, p. 74.

8) Dr Risto Jeremić: *Prilozi istoriji zdravstvenih i medicinskih prilika Bosne i Hercegovine pod Turskom i Austrijom*, (The Contribution to the Study of the History of Health and Medical Services in Bosnia and Hercegovina under Turkey and Austria), Belgrade, 1952, pp.18-25.

9) Đorđe Pejanović: *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine*, (The History of Population in Bosnia and Hercegovina), Belgrade, 1955, p. 75.

10) Milorad Ekmečić: *The International Migratorial Movements from the Yugoslav Lands from the End of the XVIII Century till 1941*, »Les migrations internationales de la fin du XVIII siècle a nos jours«, CNRS, Paris, 1981, p. 373.

11) J. Heimfelson: *Die deutsche Kolonien in Bosnien*, Leipzig, 1911.

complained that the German way of greeting with »Good day« prevailed, and also that young persons were greeting older persons first, and not vice versa. It was only after 1882 that the Christians assumed a modern attitude towards their Church. Until that time there were conspicuously few churches in Serbian-Orthodox villages, and in several districts it was the case that a peasant had not been to church in his lifetime, for there was no church anywhere in the vicinity. Modern Serbian-Orthodox clergy began to be educated only after the new religious schools were opened after 1882, and the Catholic clergy lost its visible oriental character, and became modernized.

These changes took place in towns mostly, for until 1878 even town with population of 21.000 like Sarajevo did not possess a single book-shop. But even the changes that occurred after that time were more visible to the local people, than to those with European standards. The poet Jovan Dučić said of the city of Mostar before 1914 that »it was separated from Europe by poverty as by a chasm. Nothing could move the town from its stony apathy. There were no noisy days, dissipated nights, or street incidents; at noon shopkeepers slumbered in their shops, and animals lay in the middle of the street.«⁴⁾

What was different after the end of Turkish rule was not the spirit of change, but the speed at which changes occurred. The looms used in Sarajevo in the middle of the XIXth century were those that had been used 400 years before.⁵⁾ Nevertheless, all urban centres which flourished after 1878, the roads which were being built hastily because of trade and military need, the industrial areas which were developing were all created on foundations laid in Turkish times. At the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation the only strategic novelty was the avoidance of constructing roads or building industrial centres in the eastern regions of the country, those closest to Serbia. It was a conscious effort to insulate her with a belt of backwardness.

The Bosnian woman was the heroine of Bosnian history. Because of the low level of civilization and general sanitary conditions, birthrate was low and it was kept up by the permanent pregnancy of women. In the middle of the past century there was a saying that »of glasses and children one can never have too many – glasses get broken, and the children die.«⁶⁾ With the termination of the Turkish rule in 1878, the situation was to change slightly. Thus a draft board between 1899 and 1905 found that the death-rate among the Bosnian soldiers was three times that of the death-rate of soldiers from other parts of the Habsburg monarchy. Among the Bosnians there were twice as many of those permanently unfit for military service, and they were six times more

4) Jovan Dučić: *Aleksa Šantić, »Mostar i Hercegovina«*, Mostar, 1937, p. 66.

5) Ilija Hadžibegović: *Promjene u strukturi gradskog stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini, 1878-1914*, (The Changing Structure of the Urban Population in Bosnia and Hercegovina), »Pregled«, 2, Sarajevo, 1976; Milorad Ekmečić: *The Role of the small Enterprise in the Emergence of the Industrial Revolution in Yugoslav Lands from the End of XVIII Century till 1941*, »Petite enterprise et croissance industrielle dans le monde au XIX et XX siècles«, CNRS, Paris, 1981, p. 849.

6) I. F. Jukić: o.c., p. 347.

Austrian Consul in Tuzla wrote in a report that most people did not use yeast for baking bread, although they were acquainted with it.³⁾ It was only in the middle of the century, that the skill of grafting fruittrees was introduced from Croatia, and at the same time, a better way of storing potatoes in pits; potatoes could be used for 8 months a year at the most. As late as the 1860-ies all travellers complained of piles of dung in village streets, because it was not used as manure in agriculture. Of agriculture Ami Boue said that it was »in the state it had been at the time of the Jewish patriarchs, or in the Middle Ages.« Ploughing resembled scratching the soil with an old wooden plough, since before the Osijek plough-factory was opened, there were no ploughs in Bosnia either. The first steam-engines were introduced only after 1870. Nevertheless, the Bosnian »age of steam« arrived after 1900, when by 1914 about 1.600 kilometers of narrow-gauge railways would be constructed. Normal-gauge was not avoided on account of any desire to make better connections with Europe impossible, as a number of historians believed, but because of the intention to cover all investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the meagre budget of the province. Railways accelerated the turnover of goods and mobility of people by 6 to 8 times. Roads were being constructed after 1851. At that time an ox-drawn vehicle would take 7 days to cover the distance from the river Sava to Sarajevo. A horse-driven carriage took half that time. After 1882 the time was cut down to 18 hours by railway, as opposed to the 4 hours it takes today.

Until 1878 the Turkish towns resembled the mediaeval towns of Europe. After the introduction of building regulations (*Bauordnung*) in 1880, the new Austro-Hungarian administration began to modernize them, but it was noticeable that most of the public buildings erected at the time of the Turkish reforms before 1878 had been built in European style, and most of the Austrian ones, after 1878 – in oriental style. Austria-Hungary wanted to preserve the oriental character of the province, hence the many Islamic imitations in the architecture of city-hall buildings, secondary schools and railway-stations.

Up to 1878 most people did not use a fork, and low oriental tables were used in the house. The first European suits reached Bosnia as late as 1878 with the return of 110.000 refugees from Croatia, where they had escaped the uprising on Turkish territory. Arms were taken from the peasants for political reasons in 1851, and since that time carrying arms had not been an obligatory part of men's national costume. The basic form of the family was the stem family (*zadruga*). It started breaking up after 1880, but they have not disappeared even to this day. With the creation of small families, the building of smaller family-homes began, and glass-windows became the norm. The progress of European civilization threatened many old habit, but the change went unnoticed. The old way of greeting had been connected with everpresent religious identification: with the Serbian-Orthodox it was »Pomozbog« (God help you), with the Catholics »Hvaljen Isus« (Praised be Jesus). From 1880 people

3) Galib Šljivo: *Sprovođenje Hatihumajuma u Tuzlanskom kajmakamatu 1856*, (The Introduction of Reforms into Practice in Tuzla District 1856), »Istorijski zbornik«, 4, Banja Luka, 1983.

Milorad Ekmečić

THE ADVANCE OF CIVILIZATION AND NATIONAL POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN XIXth CENTURY

The basic thesis of this paper is that the national movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina were conditioned not only by the negative policy of the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian governments, but also by the retarded development of modern civilization. It was only when those movements had become sufficiently strong to take the progress of civilization in their own hands, and not to leave it to foreign governments that they obtained their historical opportunity to succeed in this. This story would have been more convincing, had the present paper encompassed the broader historical period up to 1918, instead of merely to 1908. On the other hand, there is a disharmony between the central geographical position of the province in the future Yugoslav political entity and its peripheral role in the history of the struggle for the creation of that political entity. It rather late became a factor in Yugoslav and world history, so that I. F. Jukić, the writer, complained as early as 1851, that nothing about it was known anywhere in the world, as if it belonged to »some country in the back of beyond«.¹⁾

The Advance of Civilization and the Formation of New Urban Classes

It seemed to the Frenchman Ami Boué in 1840²⁾ that in the entire Turkish Empire, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was no optician, and that the wearing of spectacles had not been a part of everyday life. In 1854 the

1) I. F. Jukić: *Zemljopis i povjestnica Bosne*, 1851 (The Geography and History of Bosnia), in the first volume of his collected works, Sarajevo, 1973, p. 165.

2) Ami Boué: *La Turquie d'Europe*, III, Paris, 1840, pp. 1-35.